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ABSTRACT
We present the design and prototype implementation of Con-
Script, a framework for using JavaScript to allow casual
Web users to participate in an anonymous communication
system. When a Web user visits a cooperative Web site,
the site serves a JavaScript application that instructs the
browser to create and submit “dummy” messages into the
anonymity system. Users who want to send non-dummy
messages through the anonymity system use a browser plug-
in to replace these dummy messages with real messages.
Creating such conscripted anonymity sets can increase the
anonymity set size available to users of remailer, e-voting,
and verifiable shuffle-style anonymity systems. We outline
ConScript’s architecture, we address a number of potential
attacks against ConScript, and we discuss the ethical issues
related to deploying such a system. Our implementation
results demonstrate the practicality of ConScript: a work-
station running our prototype ConScript JavaScript client
generates a dummy message for a mix-net in 81 millisec-
onds and it generates a dummy message for a DoS-resistant
DC-net in 156 milliseconds.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.1 [Computers and Society]: Public Policy Issues—
privacy ; C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]:
General—security and protection
Keywords
anonymity; conscripted; traffic analysis; dummy messages
1. INTRODUCTION
Although anonymity systems based on verifiable shuffles [31]
and delayed message forwarding [7] may offer strong privacy
guarantees, the high end-to-end latency that these systems
impose makes them relatively unpopular. Thus, users of
Mixmaster [17], Mixminion [7], and other such systems, may
enjoy strong anonymity, but only amongst a small number
of users. In many real-world situations, being an anony-
mous within a small set of users is almost as bad as having
no anonymity at all, especially since surveillance agencies
may give extra scrutiny to an anonymity system’s encrypted
traffic flows [20]. In contrast, low-latency anonymity sys-
tems such as Tor [8], have relatively large user bases but
∗Work conducted while author was a staff member at Yale
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provide no protection against ISP-level adversaries [19]. A
whistleblower trying to“leak”documents anonymously is left
to choose between unpopular anonymity systems with rela-
tively strong security properties and more popular systems
which are vulnerable to low-cost traffic-analysis attacks.
To help increase the size of anonymity sets in strong ano-
nymity systems—and thus to make these systems more use-
ful in practice—we propose forming conscripted anonymity
sets using JavaScript. Our framework, called ConScript,
is compatible with a number of anonymity systems, so we
describe the high-level ideas in the context of a generic an-
onymity system. Later on, we discuss how to apply the
generic framework to popular anonymity systems.
Like AdLeaks [26], an independently developed architec-
ture focusing on document leaking, ConScript leverages Java-
Script programs served by Web servers to increase anonym-
ity set size. In contrast with AdLeaks, ConScript is compat-
ible with existing anonymity systems, ConScript offers some
protection against active attacks by malicious insiders, and
ConScript avoids the problem of message collisions and the
need for error-correcting codes in AdLeaks.
In ConScript, cooperative Web servers host a JavaScript
application containing the anonymity system’s client code.
Whenever a user browses to a cooperating Web site, the
JavaScript application instructs the user’s browser to func-
tion as a client of the anonymity system. The browser per-
forms the encryption and processing necessary to create a
“dummy” client message, then it submits the message to
the underlying anonymity system via the XMLHttpRequest
mechanism. To avoid enlisting users against their will, the
Web server may obtain the explicit consent of Web users
before running the ConScript JavaScript.
Actual users of the anonymity system, who want to send
messages anonymously through the system, use a browser
plug-in to intercept the JavaScript client’s dummy message
and replace it with a real message for the anonymity system.
If these “real” messages are indistinguishable from the con-
scripted user’s “dummy” messages, the effective number of
participants in the anonymity system (from the perspective
of an adversary) is equal to the number of honest real users
plus the number of conscripted users. Thus, actual users
can hide amongst a much larger set of casual users browsing
the Internet. Careful construction of the plug-in protects
against arbitrarily malicious Web servers (who try to distin-
guish real users from conscripted users), eavesdroppers, and
adversarial clients.
When paired with a compatible anonymity system, using
ConScript can only increase the anonymity given to a par-
ticular client. In the worst case, the anonymity that a client
gets is equal to the total number of real users—i.e., no worse
than it would have been without using ConScript.
To demonstrate the practicality of ConScript, we have im-
plemented proof-of-concept JavaScript clients for two differ-
ent underlying anonymity systems: a mix-net and a DoS-
resistant client/server DC-net [6]. These proof-of-concept
applications are not wire-compatible with the correspond-
ing deployed systems—we use them only to approximate the
performance of the client application in a deployed system.
We have tested ConScript’s JavaScript application on a
Linux workstation, a Mac laptop, an Apple iPhone, and
an Android phone using the Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and
Opera Web browsers (where available). On a Linux work-
station using the Chrome Web browser, generating a mix-
net dummy message takes 81 ms and generating a dummy
message for the DC-net-style system takes 156 ms. On an
iPhone running the Chrome Web browser, generating the
mix-net dummy message takes 9,009 ms and generating the
DC-net-style message takes 62,973 ms. We also compare the
power required for generating dummy messages to the power
required for normal Web browsing activity. On an Android
phone, generating a DC-net-style dummy message consumes
2.3× more energy than the energy consumed while browsing
a Webmail client for the same amount of time, and message
generation consumes 4.9× more energy than is consumed
while browsing a news Web site.
This paper’s contributions are:
• a general framework for using Web users to increase the
anonymity set size of a number of existing anonymity
systems,
• an analysis of a variety of attacks against conscripted
anonymity systems and prevention techniques,
• discussion of the ethical issues surrounding conscripted
anonymity,
• a prototype implementation of ConScript’s JavaScript
client for two different anonymity systems: a mix-net
and a DoS-resistant client/server DC-net, and
• evaluation of ConScript on a variety of devices.
Section 2 outlines ConScript’s architecture. Section 3 de-
scribes how ConScript defends against a number of possible
attacks. Section 4 addresses ethical issues related to con-
scripted anonymity, Section 5 summarizes the results of our
implementation and evaluation, Section 6 describes related
work, and Section 7 concludes.
2. ARCHITECTURE
This section introduces ConScript’s system participants,
summarizes the trust assumptions we make, and discusses
the compatibility of ConScript with a number of pre-existing
anonymity systems.
The overall goal of ConScript is to increase the anonymity
set size provided to the users of an underlying anonymity
system by conscripting casual Web users into participating
in the anonymity system. ConScript should provide these
properties even if a number of the participants collude to
undermine the anonymity of the system.
2.1 Participants
ConScript’s architecture consists of three components: an
underlying anonymity system, a number of cooperative Web
servers, and Web users. Figure 1 provides a pictorial repre-
sentation of the interaction of the system’s participants.
Figure 1: Overview of ConScript’s system architecture.
Anonymity system nodes. At the core of ConScript’s
architecture is a pre-existing anonymous messaging system.
ConScript is, in principle, compatible with a number of ex-
isting anonymity systems, but to make the system design
concrete, we will first describe how to use ConScript with a
mix-net consisting of single cascade of timed mixes [4].
A mix cascade consists of a set ofM dedicated mix servers,
with each server i having a well-known public key pki. Over
the course of a day (or some other time period), each of
N users submits a fixed-length message to a message pool
hosted by the first mix-server. Users serially encrypt each
message m with each of the servers’ M public keys:
E(pk1, . . . E(pkM , m) . . . )
At the end of the day, the first server shuffles the set of
ciphertexts in the message pool, removes duplicate messages,
decrypts a layer of encryption, and forwards the messages
to the second server. This process continues until the last
server holds the N plaintext messages in permuted order.
At this point, the last server could, for example, post the
anonymized messages on a public bulletin board. If at least
one server does not collude with the others, then an honest
sender’s message is anonymous amongst the h ≤ N honest
senders (provided that we ignore the possibility of active
attacks by the mix servers).
An important property of a timed cascade mix-net, and
similar systems, is that the anonymity of a single sender
increases monotonically with the number of other senders
who have submitted a message to the system. That is, the
anonymity set size of a given message in the timed mix-net
system never decreases when an additional sender adds a
message to the message pool. In certain cases (e.g., if
the senders are Sybil identities [9]), adding messages to the
pool does not increase the senders’ anonymity set size, but
these new messages do not decrease their anonymity set size
either.
ConScript takes advantage of the monotonicity of the an-
onymity in mix-net-style systems. Since adding more users
to an anonymity system cannot decrease a user’s anonym-
ity, it does not hurt to gather messages from conscripted and
unauthenticated senders and insert them into the anonymity
system.
Web servers. ConScript requires the cooperation of a
number of Web servers, each of which serves a ConScript
JavaScript application to its Web clients alongside the Web
content it would normally serve. Individuals and organi-
zations interested in supporting Internet privacy or in pro-
tecting whistleblowers might agree to embed the ConScript
JavaScript application in their Web sites. For example, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Wikipedia, and the Guardian
newspaper might each agree to serve the ConScript client
script to users visiting their Web sites.
The JavaScript application, embedded in a normal Web
page, contains the client code for the anonymity system in
use. For example, if the anonymity system were a mix-net,
the JavaScript code would contain everything that a user
would need to generate a dummy message for the mix-net.
In the case of a mix-net, the JavaScript would contain
the public keys of the M servers, a method to generate a
dummy plaintext message of the correct length, and the
public-key encryption routines for encrypting the plaintext
message with each of the M public keys.
All clients’ plaintext messages in the mix system must be-
gin with a single control bit indicating whether the message
is a dummy message (control_bit=0) or a real message
(control_bit=1). In this way, the recipient of a message
can determine whether to discard the message as a dummy
or process it as a real plaintext. The client-side ConScript
JavaScript application encrypts the control bit alongside the
clients’ plaintext message. (We describe how users send non-
dummy messages into the anonymity system later in this
section.)
We assume that the mix-net uses an IND-CCA2-secure
public key encryption scheme [25] to ensure that the en-
crypted ciphertexts leak no information about the plaintext
even under an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. In partic-
ular, the encryption of a dummy message (a string of zeros)
and the encryption of a real message (an arbitrary string
beginning with a control bit set to one) must be indistin-
guishable under an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. A
number of standard cryptosystems, including RSA-OAEP,
provide IND-CCA2 security under standard hardness as-
sumptions [11]. All IND-CCA2-secure cryptosystems use
randomized encryption routines, so the ciphertexts gener-
ated by encrypting two dummy plaintexts (strings of zeros)
will be different with overwhelming probability.
The JavaScript application also contains the code to sub-
mit the final message to the first mix server using the XML-
HttpRequest API. This HTTP request will be a cross-origin
request, since the script issuing the GET request was served by
the cooperativeWeb server, but the target of the GET request
is the mix server. The “same-origin policy” would normally
prevent the Web browser from communicating directly with
the mix servers, but the mix nodes can include the Access-
Control-Allow-Origin header in their HTTP response to
allow this sort of cross-origin request [18, 30]. The pro-
cess of submitting a client message to the mix servers will
proceed as follows:
1. The cooperative Web server at web-server.net serves
the ConScript JavaScript application to the client’s
browser.
2. The JavaScript application creates a dummy message
at the client.
3. The client issues a cross-origin XMLHttpRequest to mix-
server.net containing the dummy message.
4. The client’s browser issues a “pre-flight” request to
mix-server.net to ensure that the mix server accepts
cross-origin requests (see [30, Section 7.1.5]).
5. The mix server returns an Access-Control-Allow-
Origin: * header to the client, along with a status
code (e.g, 200 OK).
6. The client’s browser receives the Access-Control-Allow-
Origin header and passes the cross-origin response
data to the client’s JavaScript.
7. The mix server at mix-server.net adds the client’s
message to its input pool.
Casual users. Casual users, the first class of ConScript
users, are normal Internet users using standard JavaScript-
enabled Web browsers with no special browser extensions or
modifications.
When a casual user visits the target Web page (hosted
by a cooperative Web server as described above), the user’s
browser will download the page content, which includes the
ConScript client JavaScript application. Once the casual
user’s browser downloads the ConScript client application,
the script will cause the browser to send mix-net-encrypted
dummy messages into the anonymity system. In practice,
the script might ask for the user’s permission before starting
to send messages into the anonymity system (see Section 4).
After the script begins running, the casual client will not
notice any out-of-the-ordinary behavior, except for perhaps
a slight drop in browser performance due to the computa-
tional burden of generating the mix-net messages.
In this way, the casual user becomes a client of the un-
derlying anonymity system without needing to download a
browser extension or install any software tools. Casual users
need not know how to generate a public key, install a pro-
gram, or configure anonymity system client software. Since
the casual users’ browsers submit genuine client messages
into the anonymity system, these casual users are (with
caveats explained in Section 3) indistinguishable from real
users, from the perspective of an eavesdropping adversary.
Savvy users. Savvy users, the second class of ConScript
users, send non-empty messages through the anonymity sys-
tem, as opposed to the dummy messages that the casual
users send. The only difference between a casual user and
a savvy user is that every savvy user has a plug-in installed
in their Web browser that monitors the browser’s outgoing
HTTP requests. To send a message through the anonym-
ity system, the savvy user enters their secret message into
the plug-in and then browses to a cooperating Web site.
When a savvy user visits a Web page that contains our sys-
tem’s JavaScript client, the plug-in will transparently inter-
cept the outgoing message from the browser and will replace
the dummy message (generated by the JavaScript client)
with a content-carrying message generated by the plug-in.
The effectiveness of ConScript relies on the difficulty of
distinguishing savvy users from casual users, so we take a
number of steps to prevent side-channel and equivocation
attacks that would allow a malicious Web server or an eaves-
dropper to identify which users have the plug-in installed.
Section 3 describes these defenses.
2.2 Trust Assumptions
One attractive feature of ConScript’s architecture is that
it requires participants to make only minimal trust assump-
tions beyond those required by the underlying anonymity
system. We classify our assumptions into two categories:
the assumptions required to ensure that using ConScript
does not reduce the anonymity provided to a system user,
and the assumptions required to guarantee that ConScript
increases the anonymity set size of a system.
We say that a participant is “honest” if it executes opera-
tions as the system design dictates and if it does not collude
with other nodes or an external adversary.
To guarantee that using ConScript does not reduce the
level of anonymity provided by an underlying system, we
must assume that honest savvy ConScript users can access
at least one honest ConScript-enabledWeb server. This Web
server must, in turn, be able to communicate with the un-
derlying anonymity system. If savvy clients cannot access
any cooperative Web server, then these clients cannot sub-
mit their messages to the underlying anonymity system, and
the anonymity set size provided will be smaller than the to-
tal number of savvy users.
To guarantee that using ConScript has the potential to
increase the anonymity set size of the underlying anonymity
system, we must additionally assume that at least one honest
casual client must be able to communicate with at least one
honest Web server. This honest Web server must be able to
communicate with the underlying anonymity system.
We make no additional assumptions about user or server
behavior. Users (both casual and savvy) in our model can
be arbitrarily malicious—they can submit malformed mes-
sages, they can collude to submit many copies of the same
message, and they can cooperate with the Web server to try
to undermine the anonymity of some other user.
Participating Web servers can also be arbitrarily malicious—
they can serve incorrect JavaScript to users, they can serve
different JavaScript to different users, and they can selec-
tively deny service to some users (we discuss this class of
attack in Section 3.2). To maintain the security of the un-
derlying anonymity system, we only require, as stated above,
that savvy clients can communicate with at least one honest
Web server.
The underlying anonymity system might require addi-
tional trust assumptions over and above those we must make.
For example, a mix-net cascade requires that at least one of
the mix servers is honest.
2.3 Underlying Anonymity System
ConScript is compatible with any anonymity system that
has a certain set of properties, which we enumerate below.
Anonymity set size is monotonic w.r.t. users. The
anonymity provided to a particular user of the anonymity
system must increase monotonically with the number of to-
tal users of the system. If the anonymity of a particular user
can decrease when the system has more (potentially adver-
sarial) users, then conscripting many users into the anonym-
ity system might actually hurt the anonymity of the system
overall.
Simulatable traffic streams. It must be possible to
simulate the behavior of a real user such that the behavior
of the simulated user and the real user are indistinguishable
from the perspective of an adversary. For example, the mix-
net client simulator generates an onion encryption of a string
of zeros using an IND-CCA2-secure cryptosystem.
Easy to identify malformed messages. The anonym-
ity system should be able to identify and reject malformed
user messages (to prevent a malicious user from disrupting
communication).
Messages do not depend on the set of active users.
To submit a message to the anonymity system, a user should
not need to know the identities of the system’s other users.
A traditional DC-net [5], for example, would not be suitable
because it requires every user to share a secret with every
other user of the system. In contrast, the client/server DC-
net we use only requires users to know the public keys of the
system’s servers [6].
2.4 Compatible and Incompatible Anonymity
Systems
We now briefly describe which anonymity systems are
compatible with ConScript.
Yes: Timed Cascade Mixes and Verifiable Shuffles.
Timed cascade mixes (introduced in Section 2.1) and ver-
ifiable shuffles [3, 22] satisfy all properties necessary to be
compatible with ConScript.
Probably Yes: Anonymous Remailers. Any anony-
mous remailer using fixed-length messages which has the
monotonic anonymity property described above is compat-
ible with ConScript. Not all anonymous remailers exhibit
the monotonic anonymity property, however, and determin-
ing whether or not a particular remailer system has this
property is not necessarily straightforward in general. Un-
der a more restrictive threat model—in which the adversary
controls a some constant fraction of nodes in the network,
for example—it might be safe to assume that a remailer sys-
tem satisfies the monotonic anonymity property. We do not
claim that any particular remailer has the monotonic ano-
nymity property, but we assert that if any remailer system
does exhibit the property, then it would be suitable for use
with ConScript.
To create a dummy message for an anonymous remailer,
the client JavaScript application follows a process very sim-
ilar to the process used to create a dummy message for the
mix net (described earlier in this section). The dummy
plaintext is simply a string of zero bytes, padded up to the
fixed length of a remailer plaintext. The client prepends a
control bit to its message, indicating whether or not the mes-
sage is a dummy. The client then iteratively encrypts this
message with the public keys of each remailer server, using
an IND-CCA2-secure cryptosystem. By the indistinguisha-
bility property of the cryptosystem, an encrypted dummy
message and a real message will be indistinguishable. We
discuss other design issues related to using remailers in Sec-
tion 5.
Probably No: Tor. To be useful with ConScript,
there must be an efficient mechanism for a casual client to
generate a dummy traffic stream into the anonymity system
that is indistinguishable from the stream that a savvy user
would generate. While generating dummy traffic in mix-
net-style systems is straightforward, it is less clear what the
analogous dummy traffic stream would look like for Tor [8].
A“straw-man”traffic simulator might try to simulate HTTP
browsing behavior by downloading a number of popular Web
sites through the Tor tunnel in random order. However,
an adversary could likely use packet timing information to
distinguish these simulated HTTP traffic streams from real
streams, which might carry a wider variety of traffic types.
In addition, it is not clear whether any anonymity gain
would result from conscripting users into the Tor network.
If a Tor user picks a route through the Tor network with
an adversarial first and last node, that user’s anonymity is
compromised. If some fraction of the relays in the Tor net-
work are dishonest, adding more clients to the Tor network
does not change the probability that a new circuit selected
through the network will begin and end at an adversary-
controlled relay [29]. Conscripting users into the Tor net-
work might actually harm real users, since the conscripted
users would consume Tor’s scarce network resources with
dummy messages, leaving less network bandwidth for real
users’ messages.
No: Threshold Mixes. In a threshold cascade mix, the
first mix server collects n messages in its input pool before
mixing the messages, removing a layer of encryption, and
sending the messages on to the next mix server [27]. Thresh-
old mixes are not suitable for use with ConScript because
the anonymity of the mix is not monotonic in the number of
users. If there are n honest users of the mix, the anonymity
set size provided to each sender is n. If one dishonest user
is able to insert a message into the mix before the honest
users begin submitting messages to the mix, then the mix
will fire after n − 1 honest users have submitted messages
to the mix. The effective anonymity set size for these users
then decreases to n − 1 from n. Adding a dishonest user
to the system decreases the anonymity set size provided to
existing users of the system. Conscripting many potentially
dishonest users into a threshold mix system could weaken
the anonymity of the users of that system.
2.5 Effective Anonymity Set Size
As long as the behavior of a casual user is indistinguishable
from the behavior of a savvy user—even if the Web server
and many other users are malicious—the savvy users can
“hide amongst” the casual users.
Consider a deployment of ConScript that has j (honest)
savvy users and k (honest) casual users, whose messages
reach the anonymity system servers. ConScript provides
a level of anonymity equivalent to the level that would be
offered by the underlying system when run with j real users
plus k users who submit “dummy”messages into the system.
In the simple cascading mix-net we described earlier, the
effective anonymity set size would be j + k.
2.6 Limiting Participation Rate
The ConScript JavaScript client runs whenever a casual
user visits a ConScript-enabled Web site and has consented
(explicitly or implicitly) to participation in the system. Al-
though the ConScript client could instruct the casual client’s
browser to submit messages into the underlying anonymity
system as often as possible, this “always on” policy is just
one of many possible participation policies. The ConScript
client could instruct the browser to generate a message with
probability 1/t, so that the browser generates a message
after a t visits to the Web site, in expectation. This rate-
control technique would also enable the Web server to the
rate at which users (both casual and savvy) send messages
into the underlying anonymity system, which could prevent
a flood of honest casual users from overwhelming the system.
Since battery life is a concern on mobile devices, the Web
server could also impose more severe rate limits on mobile
devices to prevent the ConScript JavaScript from quickly
consuming a casual mobile user’s battery. (We evaluate Con-
Script’s impact on battery life in Section 5.)
3. ATTACKS AND DEFENSES
function MakeAnonymityMessage() {
// Code to generate a dummy message
// ...
return dummy_msg;
}
// Plug-in replaces MakeAnonymityMessage()
var msg = MakeAnonymityMessage();
var success = UploadToServer(msg);
(a) Correct code
function MakeAnonymityMessage() {
return "Bogus!";
}
// Plug-in replaces MakeAnonymityMessage()
var msg = MakeAnonymityMessage();
// Distinguishing attack
if(msg == "Bogus!") {
// User is a casual user
} else {
// User is a savvy user (has plug-in)
}
var success = UploadToServer(msg);
(b) Evil code
Figure 2: Examples of correct and evil JavaScript code
served by a Web server in ConScript.
In this section, we consider possible attacks against Con-
Script, leaving attacks against the underlying anonymity
system out of scope.
3.1 Malformed JavaScript
An adversarial Web server might modify the JavaScript it
sends to the client in an attempt to distinguish savvy users
(who have the conscripted anonymity set browser plug-in
installed) from casual users (who do not have the plug-in).
For example, the pseudo-code in Figure 2a shows the correct
JavaScript for generating dummymessages. Figure 2b shows
the code that a malicious Web server might send to try to
distinguish savvy users from casual users.
To defeat these attacks, the browser plug-in must only re-
place the dummy message with the savvy user’s real message
when the JavaScript on the relevant page exactly matches
the JavaScript that the plug-in expects to see. To perform
this check, the browser plug-in must have a copy of the Java-
Script code that it expects the Web server to send. If the
Web server sends JavaScript code that does not match the
expected code, the plug-in should simply run the JavaScript
as a casual user would.
The requirement that the plug-in have a copy of the Web
server’s expected code is somewhat burdensome—it restricts
the type of content that the Web server can serve alongside
the ConScript JavaScript application. A modern Web page
often has tens of linked scripts, iframes, Flash movies, and
other dynamic content, but a malicious Web server could ex-
ploit any of these objects running alongside the JavaScript
client to mount a distinguishing attack. Preventing the dis-
tinguishing attack requires the plug-in to have a copy of all
content on the page (except for static text and images). In
this way, the plug-in can detect when the server has served
malicious or incorrect JavaScript to the user.
The static text and images on the site do not need to be
bundled with the plug-in because a Web server that serves
different static content to different Web users gains no ad-
vantage in distinguishing savvy users from casual users. If
the casual and savvy users both are running the same cor-
rect ConScript JavaScript code but the server sends different
static images to different clients, a casual client will handle
the static content in exactly the same way that a savvy client
would, since the ConScript client does not read or execute
static page content.
In the future, there may be a way to use the iframe’s
sandbox attribute in HTML5 to allow the Web server to
serve rich content along with the JavaScript client. For ex-
ample, the JavaScript client could run in the parent frame
and the server’s rich content could run inside of a sandboxed
iframe. In this way, the server could provide interactive
content while also supporting conscript anonymity sets. We
leave a rigorous treatment of this application of sandboxing
for future work.
3.2 Selective Denial of Service
A malicious Web server could try to distinguish savvy
users from casual users by selectively denying service to users
of to the anonymity system, in an attack analogous to the
trickle attack against mix-nets [27]. For example, if the at-
tacker wants to determine if a particular user is a savvy user,
the Web server could serve incorrect JavaScript to all users
except a particular target user and a set of users that the
attacker controls.
If the anonymity system outputs a real message when fed
messages from only the target user as input, then the mali-
cious Web server both learns that the target user is a savvy
user and the attacker learns the content of the savvy user’s
message.
One technique to prevent such attacks is to maximize the
number of cooperating Web servers serving the JavaScript
application. Every savvy client could visit a number of Web
servers (instead of just one) to ensure that a single malicious
Web server cannot block communication between users and
the anonymity system. Other techniques for preventing the
trickle attack could also apply here [27].
3.3 Dangers of Cryptography in the Browser
The application that generates casual clients’ dummymes-
sages must implement public-key cryptography algorithms
in JavaScript. (In contrast, the savvy clients’ messages are
constructed by the browser plug-in, which presumably can
access standard cryptography libraries.)
The Web browser environment is not the ideal place to
run cryptographic software: many browsers do not offer a
source of cryptographic randomness, it is difficult to prevent
side-channel attacks in the browser—perhaps mounted by a
script running in another tab—and client-side cryptography
libraries are less mature than their server-side counterparts.
Even so, these limitations may not be fatal. In the worst
case, a flaw in or a side-channel attack against the client-side
cryptography library will allow an adversary to distinguish
the savvy from the casual clients but such an attack will not
allow the adversary to read the savvy clients’ messages or to
otherwise violate the anonymity of the underlying system.
Since the savvy clients’ messages are generated using the
browser plug-in, and since modern Web browsers allow plug-
ins to execute native code through the Netscape Plugin Ap-
plication Programming Interface (NPAPI), the savvy clients’
messages will be encrypted using cryptographic routines pro-
vided by conventional cryptography libraries (e.g., GPG).
Thus, in the worst case of an adversary who can distinguish
all casual clients from savvy clients, a savvy client will be
still be anonymous amongst the set of savvy clients, all of
whom use the plug-in to encrypted their messages.
3.4 Sybil Attack
Many anonymity systems will not release plaintext mes-
sages until the estimated level of anonymity passes a certain
threshold. For example, a “threshold and timed mix” [27]
collects messages for at least t seconds and until there are
at least n messages in the input pool before processing the
messages in the mix’s pool. If each of the n messages comes
from a different honest user (and if we ignore other possible
attacks), the size of each user’s anonymity set is n. However,
if a single Sybil attacker [9] can send n−1 messages into the
mix (a flood attack [27]), then the one honest user’s effec-
tive anonymity set size will be one—the system provides no
anonymity at all.
Verifiable shuffle [3] and e-voting schemes prevent these
attacks by keeping a “roster” of registered users public keys
and requiring a certain number of authenticated registered
users to submit messages to the system before processing
the messages.
We can adopt a similar technique to prevent Sybil attacks.
The anonymity system maintains a roster of registered users
of the system. Registered users (a subset of the savvy users)
store their keypair in the conscripted anonymity set plug-
in. When a registered user enters their message into the
anonymity set plug-in, the plug-in presents them with the
offer to sign their message to the anonymity system. The
anonymity system could then collect n messages signed by
registered users, plus any number of messages from unregis-
tered users, before it fires the mix (or executes the verifiable
shuffle operation). To prevent the Web server and anonym-
ity system from learning which registered users submitted
messages in a given time period, registered users could au-
thenticate using a “use-l-times” pseudonym system [16].
An important point is that registered users lose their abil-
ity to hide amongst the casual users: since registered users
sign their messages to the anonymity system, the Web server
can distinguish registered users by observing the signature,
or lack of a signature, on a message. Unregistered savvy
users can still submit messages to the system and hide amongst
the casual users, it is just that messages sent by savvy users
do not count towards the n-message threshold for firing the
mix.
3.5 Output Message Formatting
If the ConScript JavaScript application and the ConScript
browser plug-in generate messages for the underlying ano-
nymity system that are syntactically different, an attacker
could use these syntactic differences to mount a distinguish-
ing attack. For example, a mix-net ciphertext created by
the client-side JavaScript application and ConScript plug-in
might be encoded as a JSON object. If the JavaScript appli-
cation and plug-in produce JSON objects which use slightly
different formatting conventions (tabs versus spaces, single
versus double quotes, ordering of keys in a dictionary data
structure, etc.), an eavesdropping adversary could use these
formatting differences to distinguish savvy users from ca-
sual users. These subtle formatting differences could arise
if the JavaScript and plug-in applications use different seri-
alization or cryptography libraries, or they could arise from
implementation bugs. To prevent this class of security weak-
nesses, the implementer of a ConScript deployment should
ensure that there is a single canonical form of ConScript out-
put messages and should make certain the JavaScript and
plug-in applications both generate messages that conform to
that convention.
3.6 Side-Channel Attacks
There are a number of possible side-channels that an ad-
versary could use to distinguish casual users from savvy
users. For example, casual users generate one message when
they load the client JavaScript (a dummy message), while
savvy users generate two messages (a dummy message and
then a real message). If it takes twice as long for savvy users
to generate their messages, an adversary could use timing
information to distinguish the casual users from savvy users.
To prevent this particular attack, savvy clients could pre-
generate the real message that they will send to the anonym-
ity system servers so that the time it takes for them to run
the client JavaScript and send their message back to the Web
server is nearly equal to the time taken by a casual client.
This is just one of many side-channel attacks that an imple-
mentation of ConScript must consider—we draw attention
to this class of attacks without attempting to address them
all.
3.7 Number of Savvy Users Leaked
The casual users in ConScript submit “dummy”messages
into the system. In a mix-net, a dummy message might be
a string of zeros, serially encrypted with the public keys of
each of the mix servers. Once the mix servers process the
n messages in their input pools, the last mix server will be
able to count how many dummy messages there were in the
input pool. In this way, the last mix server can learn how
many savvy users sent messages into the system.
The mix server might be able to use this information to
mount an intersection attack [13] over a period of time to
make an educated guess about which users are savvy users
and which are casual users. Intersection attacks are a prob-
lem for every class of anonymity system, so we leave protec-
tion against this class of attacks out of scope.
3.8 Plug-in Distribution
Since only savvy users will download the browser plug-in,
if the adversary can find out who has downloaded the Con-
Script browser plug-in, the adversary can distinguish the
savvy users (who have the plug-in) from the casual users
(who do not). One possible way to prevent this attack would
be to distribute the plug-in using networks that the adver-
sary cannot monitor. For example, a group of acquaintances
could share the plug-in software by exchanging USB flash
drives.
4. ETHICAL ISSUES
Up to this point, we have considered only the technical
questions related to the deployment of ConScript, but we
have not addressed the equally important ethical issues that
deployment of such a system would raise. The fundamental
question is whether it is ethical to “conscript” an unsus-
pecting Web user into participating in an anonymity system
without the user’s consent. Instead of trying to resolve this
ethical question here, we will outline three possible deploy-
ment scenarios of ConScript (with varying levels of “con-
scription”) and will make an ethical argument for each.
User opt out. One possible way to deploy ConScript
would be to require the cooperating Web server to display
a conscripted anonymity “badge” on any Web page that
serves the ConScript JavaScript client. Web users could“opt
out” of participation in the ConScript by clicking the badge.
FlashProxies [10], a system for using Web browsers for cen-
sorship circumvention, takes this approach.
Another possibility would be to modify the Web site’s
“terms of service” to indicate that by visiting the Web site,
the user implicitly consents to being conscripted into an an-
onymity system. In this way, being conscripted into an ano-
nymity system would constitute a Web user’s “payment” for
visiting the Web site, much as Web users today download
ads and JavaScript trackers as payment for viewing com-
mercial Web content.
A utilitarian argument in favor of an “opt-out” approach
is that the total social benefit of ConScript is much greater
than the total social cost of conscription for the unsuspecting
Web users. This argument would be most persuasive in areas
where the probable risk to a conscripted Web user is low
but where the social benefit of anonymous communication
is high. For example, in a country with a judicial system
that would not imprison a conscripted Web user just for
being conscripted, and with an invasive Internet surveillance
regime, an “opt-out” policy might be the most ethical one.
Another argument in favor of the opt-out deployment strat-
egy is that using opt-out might actually protect conscripted
and savvy Web users by making it easier to deny (e.g., to the
secret police) that these users ever agreed to use an anonym-
ity system. If users are required to opt in to ConScript, then
this act of consent might actually make the user legally li-
able for participating in the anonymity system, which would
make the user more vulnerable than if there had been no
opt-in mechanism at all.
User opt in. Another possible deployment strategy would
be to require the explicit consent of Web users before con-
scripting their browsers into the anonymity system. For ex-
ample, a pop-up window appearing after the Web page loads
could explain the anonymity system to the user, including
the potential effects on the user’s bandwidth and power us-
age, and then ask whether the user wants to participate.
An ethical argument in favor of an “opt-in” deployment
strategy is that a Web user should have the choice of whether
or not to participate in ConScript, especially if participation
could consume the user’s bandwidth or drain the battery on
the user’s mobile device. Giving the user a choice to opt in
to the network allows those users who want to participate
the option to do so, but does not force participation in an an-
onymity system on those who do not. This argument would
be especially persuasive if the cost of being conscripted into
an anonymity system is high. If users could be imprisoned
without trial for being suspected of using an anonymity sys-
tem, then an opt-in strategy might be the most ethical one.
Unethical even with opt in. Yet another ethical posi-
tion is that deploying conscripted anonymity is not ethical
under any circumstances, even when using an opt-in mech-
anism. One argument supporting this position is that the
risks of being conscripted into an anonymity system might
not be clear to a novice Web user, even after the user is
presented with a description of the conscripted anonymity
system. If the user does not have the technical understand-
ing to make an informed decision about the risks of opting
in to the system, then it might not ever be ethical to offer
users the option to participate in ConScript.
ConScript is compatible with both “opt out” and “opt in”
policies, so the decision of which policy to use can be left to
the organization deploying such a system. Different policies
will be appropriate in different societal contexts. In con-
texts where the risks to conscripted users are high, using
ConScript may not be appropriate at all.
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
This section presents evaluation results for our proof-of-
concept implementation of a ConScript JavaScript client.
5.1 ConScript Client
To evaluate the performance of ConScript, we have im-
plemented the JavaScript client applications for two ano-
nymity systems: a timed cascade mix-net and a verifiable
client/server DC-net. Our prototypes perform all of the
cryptographic operations that a full-featured JavaScript client
would perform but they do not yet produce messages that
are wire-compatible with the underlying anonymity systems.
To be useful, the ConScript JavaScript client must be able
to produce at least one dummy message before the user
browses away to another page. One recent survey of Web
usage finds that the median time spent on a Web page is 11
seconds [15], so the JavaScript application should generate
at least one dummy message every few seconds.
We tested each prototype on four platforms: a modern
Linux workstation (Ubuntu 13.04), a Mac laptop (Mac OS
10.6), an iPhone 4 (iOS 6), and a Motorola Android phone
(Android 2.2). We tested the JavaScript client on each de-
vice using the Chrome 26, Firefox 21, Safari 5, and Opera
Mobile 12 browsers, where available. We used “Web work-
ers” (essentially JavaScript threads) to prevent the browser
GUI from freezing while it executes long-running crypto-
graphic operations.
Mix-net and Remailer. To simulate the casual user
workload for a mix-net or anonymous remailer, we created
a JavaScript application that encrypts a 256-byte message
with five layers of RSA-2048 public key encryption using
the OpenPGP.js JavaScript library [23]. Table 1 presents
results for the mix-net client. Our results demonstrate that
even a CPU-limited mobile device can generate a mix-net
dummy message in fewer than 10 seconds, which is less time
than the median time spent on a Web page (11 seconds, as
explained above).
To make ConScript work with a real mix-net or remailer,
there must be some way of distributing the public keys of
the mix servers to the users (both casual and savvy) of the
system. One possible distribution method would be to have
Mix-net DC-net
Workstation Chrome 81 156
Intel W3565 3.20 GHz Firefox 73 1,781
Laptop Chrome 133 231
Intel Core 2 Duo 2.53 GHz Firefox 171 3,062
Safari 669 3,338
Apple iPhone 4 Chrome 9,009 62,973
Apple A4 (speed unknown) Safari 7,280 32,972
Motorola Milestone Opera † 63,504
ARM Cortex-A8 600 MHz
† Opera Mobile does not support the getRandomValues API
required by OpenPGP.js.
Table 1: Time (milliseconds) to generate a ConScript
“dummy” user message in JavaScript using different hard-
ware/browser combinations.
a set of directory authorities (as in Tor [8]) who collective
maintain the list of public keys. The savvy users would have
a signature verification public key for each of the directory
authorities hard-coded into their ConScript browser plug-
in. Whenever the list of mix servers changes (e.g., because a
new mix server comes online), all of the directory authorities
sign the list of keys and then distribute the signed list to the
Web servers.
When the Web server serves the JavaScript client appli-
cation to a user, the server includes the latest list of pub-
lic keys in a block of static text on the page. The casual
user’s ConScript JavaScript application would read in the
public keys and generate a dummy message. A savvy user’s
browser plug-in first checks the served JavaScript (as de-
scribed in Section 3.1), then reads in the list of public keys
from the page, verifies the signatures of each of the entropy
authorities on the list, and then uses the list of public keys
to encrypt its message.
Verifiable DC-net. To simulate a casual user’s work-
load when using a more computationally intensive anonym-
ity system, we implemented the client functionality for a
verifiable DC-net [6, 12] using the Stanford JavaScript cryp-
tography library [28]. Generating a dummy message for
the verifiable DC-net requires the client to perform ellip-
tic curve operations and to generate a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof. Our evaluation uses NIST’s P-256 elliptic
curve group [21] and requires the client to generate a 32-byte
dummy message. The performance results (Table 1) for the
verifiable DC-net suggest that the ConScript JavaScript ap-
plication is arguably practical on faster machines, since both
the workstation and laptop were able to generate a dummy
message in less than four seconds each. Performance on the
CPU-limited iPhone is less impressive—generating a single
message took at least 30 seconds.
In a real-world deployment of ConScript, the Web browser
might serve the JavaScript application only to machines that
the server expects will be able to generate dummy messages
quickly. For example, the server could avoid sending the
application to browsers running on the iOS or Android op-
erating systems, as determined by the HTTP User-Agent
header.
5.2 Power Consumption on Mobile Devices
Battery life is an important limitation on mobile devices.
If a Web page serving a ConScript JavaScript client consis-
Figure 3: Approximate CPU power consumption on Android
phone during Web browsing and anonymity conscription.
Average Energy
Power (mW) Consumed (mWh)
Idle 17.7 0.52
News 74.5 2.19
Webmail 162.8 4.79
Conscript 376.7 10.82
Table 2: Average power usage and total energy consumption
on Android device for different browsing scenarios.
tently drained a phone’s battery, mobile users might begin to
opt out of participation in ConScript or even avoid visiting
the Web site entirely.
We evaluate the impact of ConScript on mobile devices by
measuring the power consumption due to CPU usage on the
Android phone when the phone’s user was idle, was brows-
ing a news Web site (nytimes.com), was interacting with
a Webmail service (gmail.com), and was running the Con-
Script JavaScript client for the verifiable DC-net anonymity
system described above. The trace for the ConScript client
measures the power consumed when the device generates a
DC-net ciphertext corresponding to a 32-byte dummy mes-
sage. Our experiment used the PowerTutor 1.5 [24] Android
application to estimate power usage in each scenario.
Figure 3 plots a trace of the power usage for each of the
four browsing scenarios and Table 2 summarizes the aver-
age power usage and energy consumption for each scenario.
Generating a verifiable DC-net dummy message using the
ConScript JavaScript client uses just over 2.25×more energy
than the phone used while browsing theWebmail application
for the same length of time. Generating the dummy message
consumed nearly 5× more energy than the phone consumed
while visiting the news Web site for the same length of time.
However, if a Web user visits a ConScript-enabled Web site
only a few times per day, the user might not notice the two-
fold increase in power consumption during these sessions.
To reduce the energy consumption of the ConScript Java-
Script client, the Web site serving the application could re-
duce the participation rate for mobile devices, as described
in Section 2.6. If Web sites serving the JavaScript client are
particularly sensitive to consuming more power on users’
devices, the Web sites detect mobile users (e.g., using the
HTTP User-Agent header) and could avoid serving the Java-
Script application to these users entirely.
6. RELATED WORK
The FlashProxy system [10], which was one of the inspira-
tions for this work, uses a JavaScript application to coerce
Web users into serving as bridges into the Tor anonymity
network [8]. Every additional Web browser that runs the
FlashProxy application increases the access to the Tor net-
work in regions where Tor relays are blocked. In contrast,
every additional Web browser that runs the ConScript Java-
Script application increases the anonymity available to users
of the anonymity system.
Anonymity systems have used dummy messages in the
past to deter traffic analysis attacks [2, 17]. However, these
systems use dummy messages only inside of the anonymity
network and they do not have“dummy users” send messages
into the system to increase the effective number of total users
of the system.
Bauer [1] describes a system for using a specially crafted
banner ads served to an unwitting user’s Web browser to
create a covert channel between two servers in a mix net-
work. Bauer considers only passive adversaries, whereas we
consider active adversaries that also can monitor all network
traffic. Since ConScript considers a stronger threat model,
we address a number of security issues in Section 3 that
Bauer’s work did not consider.
AdLeaks [26]—a system design published independently
while this work was in preparation—uses JavaScript served
by online advertising networks to conscript users into partic-
ipation in an anonymity system. Unlike ConScript, which is
general and compatible with a number of existing anonym-
ity system, AdLeaks conscripts users only into AdLeaks’ own
anonymity system. In addition, the AdLeaks anonymity sys-
tem is not designed to prevent active attacks by dishonest
participants in the system, whereas ConScript can protect
against such attacks. In the AdLeaks system, each con-
scripted user submits an encryption of zero to the anonym-
ity system while savvy users submit encryptions of plaintext
messages. If two savvy users submit a message in the same
transmission “slot,” a collision results and the messages are
undecipherable. AdLeaks uses error-correcting codes to al-
low communication in the presence of accidental collisions.
However, a malicious user could induce collisions in every
AdLeaks transmission slot, which would halt communication
entirely. ConScript, when used with a mix-net or verifiable
DC-net (as evaluated in Section 5), avoids the need for error-
correcting codes and is not vulnerable to these anonymous
denial-of-service attacks.
CryptoCat [14] is an encrypted chat system—not an ano-
nymity system—which performs cryptographic operations in
a Web browser plug-in, much as we propose for conscripted
anonymity’s savvy users.
7. CONCLUSION
We have described how to use JavaScript to make it eas-
ier for casual Web users to participate in strong anonymity
systems. These conscripted anonymity sets can increase the
anonymity available to users of mix-nets, verifiable shuffle
systems, and remailers. We have presented ConScript,
general architecture for conscripted anonymity, we discuss a
number of attacks against ConScript (and possible defenses),
we consider ethical issues of deploying such a system, and
we implement and evaluate a proof-of-concept prototype on
a variety of devices. ConScript can increase the user base
of formally analyzable, but unpopular, anonymity systems,
which allows the few security-sensitive users of these systems
to hide amongst a larger group of casual Internet users.
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